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Abstract: The reform of public service broadcasting (PSB) faces many 
obstacles in countries with political transition such as Indonesia. After 
1998-political change, the arrival of ideas to establish PSB in Indonesia in 
two decades lacks of appropriate policies. As in other transitional states in 
Eastern Europe, there is the lack of regulatory design as well as its 
implementation. This paper examines process of formulating PSB law in 
2002, particularly pays attention to industry capture over the making 
process as a critical tool to observe a long-controvercial of broadcasting 
law revision process in Indonesia (2012-2016). By use public interest and 
capture theories in regulation, this paper answers why the outcome of PSB 
regulation is weak by observing how the law was made. This study 
provides new analysis on PSB media law that still rare in Indonesia.  As 
independent and non-profit body, Indonesian PSB represented by RRI 
(Radio of the Republic Indonesia) and TVRI (Television of the Republic 
Indonesia) is protected by Broadcasting Act.32/2002. It was enacted in 
favor of two actors: authoritarian officials with interest to use PSB as their 
mouthpiece in one side and the industry groups with interest to apply free 
market policy on the other.  
1 Introduction and Research Design 
As a public policy, redesigning public service broadcasting (PSB) regulation in the world is 
a complex negotiation process, influenced by political system and the strength of economic 
and social culture of a country. For instance, change in political system from 
authoritarianism to liberal in transitional countries in Europe and Asia has a direct effect on 
the process of formulating new media laws, actors involved and the result. It is mostly 
indicated by contradictory policy outcome between public and private interest.  
Historically, follow the change of political system in Eastern Europe (late 1980s) and in 
Asia (late 1990s) from authoritarian and communist to liberal democratic system, PSB 
experienced significant regulatory reform. In line with the above radical reform, in the last 
20 years, there was a trend of policy changes that move PSB ownership from state into 
independent public service media [1]. Furthermore, the changing PSB policy is a direct 
response to the emergence of new technology [2].  
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The political reform 1998 which marked by the end of Suharto power (1966-1998) has 
triggered media system reform in Indonesia [3]. For example, there was public pressure to 
reform RRI and TVRI amidst rapid growth of commercial media outlets. Prevously (1996-
1998), media system was authoritarian in nature which both RRI and TVRI was state 
owned media and operated as a mouthpiece of the regime.  
One of the important regulations born after the reform 1998 was Broadcasting Law no. 
32/2002 which recognizes Public Service Broadcasting (PSB) and replaces the old 
Broadcasting Act no. 24/1997. The Act has formally changes the ownership status of RRI 
and TVRI from state to public. However, compare to similar policy in developed countries 
such as Germany and the UK, the Act is not clearly explaining structure, funding 
mechanism, content criteria and the ways that guide transformation from old to the new 
PSB system. Why? 
In article ´Researching Public Service Broadcasting`, Moe and Trine explains four types 
of PSB studies, namely policy, institutional, role of PSB in democratic life and post modern 
research. Since PSB is dependent on decisions within political realism, much research has 
focused on policy type, mainly in the regulatory governance [4]. I classify this paper as 
study of PSB governance policy in Indonesia.   
This paper examines process of formulating PSB policies in Broadcasting Act of 2002 
and pays attention to industry capture as critical tool for the similar process in the recent 
years. This study proposes as best practice for media advocates in managing their advocacy 
in the 2016-Broadcasting Law revision. I will look at PSB regulatory outcome in the 
Broadcasting Act as starting point and to limit this study, I will select four debates: legal 
status of PSB, structure, service area and funding system among actors and it will be 
explained in these two periods: agenda setting/first discussion (1998-2000) and 
negotiation/decision making phase (2000-2002).  
This paper answers two questions: First, how are debates among stakeholders on PSB 
and to what extent it was formulated in the Broadcasting Law? Second, how and why the 
existing media industry captured the PSB regulation? Broadcasting Act no. 32/2002 will be 
a primary document to analized, followed with other documents such as articles in journals, 
books and other literatures. My last observation in years 2000-2002 would also enrichs 
while other PSB policy model especially in Europe and the US will be used for comparison. 
2 Theoretical Frameworks 
2.1 PSB Regulatory Governance 
PSB is widely understood as broadcasting made, financed and controlled by the public, for 
the public. According to UNESCO researchers, it is neither commercial nor state-owned 
and free of political interference and pressure of commercial forces [5]. In order to ensure 
above condition, Smith stated PSB regulatory governance should meet the followings: (a) 
legislative regulatory framework for its sustainable development; (b) clear mandate for 
public service broadcasters; (c) exact remit and standard of content; (d) corporate and 
financing structure that ensure editorial independence; (e) mechanism for public 
accountability and (f) role to meet global challenges: digital and transnational broadcasting 
[1]. 
In legal status, most of PSB regulated as independent entity to guarantee as public asset 
in safeguarding the interests of cultural, political democracy and to balance the increasing 
commercial media. For instance, BBC and ARD (Germany) are independent Corporations. 
Furthermore, to ensure the importance of this issue, the European Union imposes 
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Amsterdam Protocol of 1997. This regulation forced former Eastern Europe states that 
joined the Union to change their regulations and old-authoritarian form of PSB [6].  
In Indonesia, political and economic crisis bring PSB regulatory issue to more complex 
one. Debates on PSB policy occur between both, the desire to create new rules to protect 
public interest by law in one side with desire to avoid strick rules resulted from historical 
and political trauma of authoritarian sytem in the past [7]. Amid the strengthening capitalist 
broadcasting industry, debates on PSB legal status, structure and funding which involved 
government, industry and civil society took long time. Recently, commercial radio and TV 
which controlled by monopolistic corporation [8] became the main enemy to establish 
public service media. To protect their power, commercial sectors actively try to limit PSB 
regulatory governance.  
2.2 Public Interest in Broadcasting Sector 
Normally, two issues: frequency scarcity and cultural porposes is classical rationales for 
PSB regulation. As a public domain, frequency is technically limited. For example, if it is 
used by any radio or TV company, the other can not use it at the same time. Hence, in the 
name of public and its limitation, frequency should be allocated for majority of the public, 
and the licensing process based on competitive roles, involves independent regulator (9). 
There is a general view that frequency should not be utilized by only government and 
industry players, but also for the benefit of citizen. Although the frequency scarcity 
doctrine is no longer valid at this time, its regulatory legacy still lives on the so-called 
“public interest” requirements over broadcasting contents. This commanded to satisfy 
public interest, convenience, and necessity [9].   
Moreover, cultural protection over social impact from television/radio content is the 
other reason why broadcasting is strictly regulated [10]. Broadcasting that is free to air has 
entered private sphere of citizen at all social and economic levels. All over the world, radio 
and television are two major media which people can access news and entertainment, and 
are often regarded as the powerful media.  
Basically, the term `Public Service` is the central point of necessary regulation for PSB 
at national and international level. Public service is used to describe a kind of provision 
deemed vital for every member of society, regardless of spending power, educational, 
social geographical location, or gender. At different times in different polities, varied 
services have belonged to this category, from public infrastructure like roads or telephone 
lines, via health care, to education as well as radio and television broadcasting [4]. In the 
liberal states such as the UK, in addition to market failure in distributing public resourse, 
PSB policy is a form of state's obligation to provide a public sphere [11].  Four aspects: 
legal status, structure, service area and the provision of PSB fund are the central policy 
debates that reflect degree of adoption to public interest in the PSB law.  
2.3 Capture Theory of Regulation 
As stipulated in Law no. 12/2011 on law making mechanism, formulation of national 
act in Indonesia is an absolute authority of both parliament and government officials. 
Hence, the legislator or government is policy maker. Unlike in the EU, Indonesia officials 
does not establish a permanent external agency or gives mandate to outside body to draft of 
a policy. Nevertheles, parliament may invite some experts as temporary consultant. By this 
power, issuing law draft formally should come from both government and parliament, 
through various steps. Civil society as well as industry may propose a draft to both 
institutions. In the formulation process, parliament formed a special team consist of 
 
    
 
 
DOI: 10.1051/, 00040 (2017) 73300040
 
33SHS Web of Conferences shsconf/201
i-COME'16 
3
parliament members that represent political parties. The team intensively organizes both 
internal meetings and public hearings prior to the enactment of a law.  
According to Barry M. Mitnick, problem in the regulatory making process arises when a 
policy maker (for Indonesia: Parliament or Government officials) acts in the industry side 
to damage public interest. It means, their policy outcome captured by industry as private-
regulated party [12]. For instance, the agency's main mandate to regulate PSB to maximize 
benefit of society is captured and the agency acts in favour of the industry interest due to 
their lack of knowledge on the broadcasting system in the policy making process. Indeed, to 
regulate PSB system, policy makers require specific knowledge such as frequency 
allocation; remit, and funding system. Mitnick describes six forms of capture: 
constitutional; systemic; relational (governance); individual; functional and chronical [12]. 
For this study, I will explain two forms: individual and functional.  
First, individual form: incentives shape decision making between legislators and the 
industry [12]. In the electoral system with high economic cost, capture occurs as a form of 
`political barter` among political parties and their politicians in one side and corporate 
donors on the other. In this model, regulatory members cum politicians need campaign 
funds to encrease their voters. The industry can easily provide `political investment` fund 
for them in order to have room to influence legislative policy outcomes of the policy 
makers in the future. Second, functional. It happens when regulated parties control and 
filter information essential to policy decision making, actively suply information that 
manipulate public opinion in order to keep their interest [12]. For instance, present on 
hearings intensively, active responses to the need of data, opinion spin in media and the 
involvement of industry expert as a temporary consultant of parliament.  
In the long history of media reform, government, politician and independent 
commission of broadcasting are vulnerable bodies to intervere. For example, the scandal of 
internet neutrality regulation applied by Federal Communication Commission, the United 
States independent body [19]. In case of Indonesia, before ratification of the Broadcasting 
Act of 2002, the discussion and encatment of the Telecommunication Act of 1999 was also 
influenced by national and international telecommunication industries. They intended 
particularly to remove barriers for foreign investment in telecommunication market [13].   
3 Debates on Indonesian PSB 
In this part, I will explain result of document analysis, mainly Broadcasting Act of 2002 
and its related documents enriched by my field observation in the past (2000-2002). During 
1998-2002, there is strong debate among government, industry and public in the process of 
formulating the Act. Government interest represents by Ministry of Communication and 
Information Technology (MCIT), while Association of Indonesian Private Television 
(ATVSI) represents industry group. Meanwhile, public interest was voiced by various 
parties:  academics of Indonesian University and some non-government organizations such 
as Indonesian Press and Broadcasting Society or MPPI [14].  In this situation, Parliament 
members tried to accommodate all opinions equally, but sometime falled in to one party 
interest. The table below desribes various proposals from all above parties over four issues 
of PSB governance: legal status, structure, service area and funding sources.  
Table 1. Proposals on PSB Governances 
 
No Issues Government Industry Public 
1 Legal status State agency under 
MCIT. A state agency 
under ministrial office 
and it established by 
State owned 
corporation, a 
commercial entity  
under ministry of 
State agency, 
independent, public 
owned, non-profit and 
it established by state 
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government state own corps in the name of public 
2 Governing 
structure 
Board of supervisory 
and board of executive 
under MCIT, elected by 
MCIT 
Board of 
commissary and 
executives as in the 
private corporation 
Board of supervisory 
and board of executive 
as in the BBC, elected 
by parliament 
3 Service area Covers the entire 
Indonesian archilepago 
with proportional 
allocation of frequency 
between public, private 
and community 
broadcasting 
Covers specifically  
for area that is not 
covered by 
commercial service, 
use only the existing 
frequency allocation 
Covers the entire 
Indonesian archilepago 
accompanied by local 
public service 
broadcasting, 
supported with highest 
portion of frequencies 
4 Funding 
sources 
State budget, lisence 
fee, social donation, 
commercial advertising 
and other appropriate 
incomes 
State budget, lisence 
fee, social donation, 
strick limitation of 
commercial 
advertising 
Lisence fee, state 
budget, social 
donation, commercial 
advertising and other 
appropriate incomes 
Source: [7, 14]   
 
All debates influence over the making period of Broadcasting Act that spends more than 
6 years from its agenda setting and drafting in the last 1997 up to the formal enactment in 
the parliament by November 28, 2002. On the PSB side, the result of these debates was 
contradicts to public interest. From all 64 articles in the Law, PSB sector is regulated only 
in 5 articles. First, article 13 that states PSB as one of four types of broadcasting institution 
in Indonesia alongside private, community and pay model.  
Second, article 14 that explain legal status, PSB mandate and its structure. This article 
describes PSB as law entity established by state, operated as independent, neutral and not 
for commercial interest, and its function to serve society. This article also states clearly that 
RRI and TVRI are choosen for PSB in one side and provides room for establishment of 
local PSB outside both institutions on the other.  
Third, article 15 explains funding sources (ranging from license fee, state annual 
budget, social donation, advertising and other appropriate incomes connected to 
broadcasting) and role of finance accountability (finance report should be audited by public 
accountant, published on media). Fourth, the two articles that regulate PSB’s content: PSB 
to broadcast programs from internal country for 60 % at minimum a day; time allocation of 
business advertising (maximum 15 %) and social advertising (minimum 30 %) of the entire 
duration a day.  
The enactment of these 5 articles indicates three conditions in favour for public interest. 
First, adoption of BBC-like model of independent and public owned PSB, changing RRI 
and TVRI’s legal status from state to public entity. Second, introduction of lisence fee as 
source of funding alongside state budget is a sign for public based PSB and public 
participation. Third, establishment of supervisory board elected by parliament is a symbol 
for formal public access to the PSB operation that was not applicable in the past.  
However, policy of service area, frequency allocation and advertising are in favour of 
market interest. As described above, the Act limits PSB to broadcast commercial 
advertising up to 15 % of the entire time a day. This followed by two government decrees 
of 2005 (translation of Broadcasting Act) that limit frequency for PSB up to 20 %, compare 
to private that receive 75 %. Limitation of commercial Ads as funding source will 
potentially disturbs PSB’s sustainability, especially in the crisis of state budget and license 
fee as ideal fundings. Also, limitation of frequency reduces opportunity to develop new 
PSB channels in order to wider public services. 
Based on these weaknesses, I argue there will be no significant reform of RRI and 
TVRI as PSB to reach audiences as citizen and create public service. To compare, before 
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enactment of the Law, RRI uses only about 15 % of frequency allocation. The rest is in 
power of private radio stations. Since year 1989, commercial televisions utilize about 95 % 
of the entire TV frequencies while TVRI only use 5% [7]. Overall, the application of two 
articles of the Law will place PSB as a minor player in the audiences compare to private 
firms.  
Furthermore, as discussed above, from the 5 articles, there is no detail explanation of 
PSB institutional design compare to specific PSB law as in the developed country. 
According to eight indicators developed by Smith [1] it only adopts 4 indicators and needs 
more articles to adopt the rest in the same level of regulation. For instance, more regulation 
needed to exact remit and standard of PSB content, finance that ensures editorial 
independence as well as the mechanisms to enhance public monitoring over the entire 
operation.  
4 Captured by Industry 
This section describes captures of industry power over formulation of PSB articles in the 
two periods: agenda setting (1998-2000) and negotiation/decision making phase (2000-
2002). To define, agenda is the list of issues in a polity, consists of both political (the list of 
issues from decision-makers) and public agenda (the list of issues from general public) 
[15]. Decision making is a final choice, an outcome of cognitive processes leading to the 
selection of action among several alternatives [16]. I will start by explaining actors 
involved in the policy making period and the dynamics of their interaction.  
During agenda setting and negotiation phases (1998-2002), Arifuddin [17] described 
enthusiasm of three actors: parliament members; officials under two presidents: Habiebie 
and Gus Dur and civil society to birth a new law which replaces old-Broadcasting Act no. 
24/1997. In the ideological perspective, there are three kinds of actor: pro democratic 
broadcasting (CSO), authoritarian broadcasting system (Government) and pro liberal media 
system represented by them [18]. Furthermore, Irma [14] explained three different groups: 
(1) private firm that intend to protect their domination in the market. At agenda setting 
process, introduction of PSB in the draft was prevented by industry, (2) civil society such 
as the Alliance of Indpendent Journalist and academics from Indonesian University which 
proposed PSB institution in broader context than only as state agency. In their view, PSB 
may be a community based stations, (3) government (via MCIT) that proposed PSB system 
under MCIT. It was contrary to general idea of independent PSB in the parliament and CSO 
[14].  
Compare to civil society, the industry’s lobby to policy maker is more intensive 
involved a wide range of collaboration among ATVSI, advertising agencies, production 
houses and broadcaster associations. It includes regular opinion publication in their own 
media; propose law draft, and personal approaches to politicians. In contrast, civil society 
with limited support from RRI and TVRI broadcasters and international agencies focuses 
only their move to public opinion through community media, grassroot level of discussion 
and mass rally.  
During 2000-2002, in summary, capture by the industry over PSB law took place in two 
steps: (1) agenda setting step, ability to setting up the central issue, (2) negotiation phase, 
ability to influence policy maker to accept policy in favour of their interest. From media 
coverages and notes of my field investigation in the past (years: 2000-2002), refer to 
Mitnick [12]. I found at least two kinds of capture below.  
In the agenda setting, the industry applied functional model. With their highest 
resources of knowledge, fund and media outlets, private TV and radio owners with their 
professionals develop massive opinion to promote the importance to protect private 
industry as key actor in economic growth. Via more than 7 national TV channels such as 
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RCTI, Indosiar and ANTV, ATVSI published regular news, talkshow and advertisements. 
At the same time, ATVSI provides data and invite experts to set a law draft favouring the 
goal, and actively sends experts to public hearings in the parliament or discuss with 
government officials.  
The long history of close-relation between private TV owners and political leaders 
obviously established common goal and influence outcomes of policy maker which depend 
on the direction from their party leaders. In Indonesia, political party needs good image and 
politicians need their safety in the parliament. The industry provides it by managing 
politician’s images in the public though massive news coverages. This can be identified as 
individual incentive model [12] although more evidences are needed to ensure this practice.  
Analyzing series of statements from ATVSI and PRSSNI (association of private radio 
owners), I conclude the main goal of their capture is protection of their companies, in the 
name of millon workers, high investment of broadcasting equipment and their claim of 
public utilily over contents. Hence, they criticize intiative to regulate PSB in the form of 
state intervention. Improvement of PSB was seen as ‘serious danger’ for their two sectors: 
huge area of audience service and advertising market incomes. Having the widest network, 
RRI and TVRI as PSB will be a strong competitor for the industry [7].  
In negotiation and decision making phase, the firms adopt similar model with the 
agenda setting with more intensive pressures. Aside of actively attend public hearings and 
gathering mass rally, they influence both parliament and MCIT officials through direct 
meetings outside offices. Finally, in respond to the enactment of Act on 28 November 2002 
which recognize independent broadcasting commission as their new regulator, the Industry 
raise protest by airing ‘dark colour’ in their TV stations which symbolizes a death of press 
freedom.  
 
5 Conclusion 
 
This paper shows that PSB debate in the policy making process in Indonesia during 
1998-2002 has been intense. Actors separate into three groups: government, industry and 
civil society. There is unequal position which the industry has more resources to create 
pressure over policy makers in favour of their dominant in the market place than civil 
society. Formally, Broadcasting Act 32/ 2002 recognizes PSB as independent and public 
owned body. It is followed by introduction of public access to the supervisory body and 
parliament right to its selection process and to supervise PSB operation in the interest of 
public. However, there is no appropriate policy to ensure sustainable improvement of PSB 
management. The two policy sectors: limitation of Ads and frequency are obviously in 
favour of the industry. Hence, in terms of public interest, the regulation is very weak.  
In my observation, this was a result of industry capture over the law making process. 
The goal of this action was mainly to keep PSB as a minor broadcasting actor in the field 
and maintain capitalist players that were already dominant. To sum up, I would like to 
address two possible solutions:  First, Broadcasting Act no. 32/2002 needs to revise. 
Concerning the huge sectors involve in the revision process which will spend long time and 
energy, the 2015-proposal from parliament to draft specific law of PSB can be a faster way 
to accelerate PSB policy reform. Second, improvement of knowledge of policy makers on 
PSB governance is a central in managing public interest in the process of both the law 
revision and addressing new specific PSB law.  
Finally, to prevent industry’s capture in upcoming PSB law revision, strong alliance is 
needed amog local and international advocates in the process of regulatory making and its 
implementation. A model of supranational intervention such as European Union to the 
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national policy of PSB can be adopted by ASEAN, a similar regional association of nations 
in South East Asia. However, in culture of secrecy, it is quite difficult to investigate deep-
coalition among Indonesian politicians as policy maker with industry in the long period of 
policy making and its impact to policy outcomes. More research is needed on this particular 
issue in the future.    
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